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REPLY

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
D'Oro v. D'Oro, 454 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1982), aff'd, 474 A.2d 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984),
remains good law in the state of New Jersey.

Although Innes v.

Innes, 542 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988),
"disagreed" with D'Oro, D'Oro was not overruled.

The Appellate

Division panel that decided Innes had no power to overrule or
disapprove D'Oro because D'Oro was decided by an appellate
panel of equal authority to the Innes panel.
There is a split of authority on the issue of whether
retirement benefits can be treated as income to the recipient
for purposes of determining alimony to be paid to the other
spouse.

The majority rule is that retirement benefits cannot

be treated as income to the recipient for purposes of
determining alimony.

Utah Supreme Court authority suggests

that Utah follows the majority rule.

ARGUMENT
I.

D'ORO IS GOOD LAW
Respondent ("Dr. Millikan") raises as his sole issue

on Cross-Appeal the trial court's error in awarding Appellant
("Mrs. Millikan") alimony based on Dr. Millikan's share of

retirement benefits, which retirement benefits were divided
between the parties pursuant to their irrevocable joint
election.

In support of his position, Dr. Millikan cites in

his Brief Utah case law and cases from other states, including
the New Jersey case of D'Oro v. D'Oro, 454 A.2d 915 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch« Div. 1982), aff8d, 474 A.2d 1070 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. DiVc 1984).
The issue decided in D'Oro was whether retirement
payments to a working spouse, who had been previously ordered
to pay alimony, should be considered as income to the working
spouse for purposes of determining alimony.

The holding of the

court, affirmed on appeal, was that retirement benefits could
not be considered as income to the working spouse.
Mrs. Millikan cites in her Reply Brief Innes v. Innes,
542 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), which "disagreed"
with D'Oro.

Mrs. Millikan incorrectly characterizes Innes as

"disapproving" D'Oro.

The Appellate Division panel deciding

Innes had no power to overrule or disapprove D'Oro.

A

discussion of the New Jersey Superior Court system is necessary
to understand the impact of Innes on D'Oro.
The New Jersey Superior Court system is divided into
three sections.

There are two trial court sections known as

Chancery and Law.

The other section is the Appellate
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Division.

The Appellate Division has twenty-eight judges who

sit in seven panels of four judges (known as "parts").

Each

part has co-equal power and cannot overrule another part or
"disapprove" the decision of another part.

Thus, it is

possible in New Jersey to have inconsistent, yet valid case
law.

Presumably, conflicts between parts are ultimately

resolved by appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the highest
court of appeals, which has not ruled on this issue.
It follows from this understanding of the New Jersey
Superior Court system that Innes had no legal impact on D'Oro.
The Innes court part obviously disagreed with D'Oro, but did
not overrule or disapprove D'Oro.

Therefore, D'Oro remains

good law in New Jersey.
II.

MOST COURTS THAT HAVE CONSIDERED THE ISSUE DO NOT TREAT
RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING
ALIMONY
Of the several states that have expressly considered

the issue raised on Cross-Appeal, most have held that
retirement benefits cannot be treated as income to the
recipient for purposes of determining alimony to be paid to the
other spouse.

This is the rule in Minnesota, Kruschel v.

Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), Wisconsin,
Pelot v. Pelot, 342 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), and, as
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noted above, in New Jersey.

Apparently, the only case reaching

a different result is the New Jersey case of Innes, discussed
above.
Mrs. Millikan, in anticipation of Dr. Millikan's Brief
on Cross-Appeal, cited Innes, Lang v. Lang, 425 N.W.2d 800
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988), In re Marriage of Baker, 251 Cal. Rptr.
126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), and In re Marriage of White, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), in opposition to the
Cross-Appeal.
Baker has absolutely nothing to do with the issue on
Cross-Appeal and appears to be an erroneous citation. White,
as noted at pages 63-64 of Dr. Millikan's Brief, actually
supports this Cross-Appeal, pointing out that double counting
of retirement benefits does occur when the non-working spouse
is awarded (or contractually entitled to receive) a portion of
the working spouse's retirement benefits.

Lang is

distinguishable on the basis that there were no facts before
the Lang court indicating that the working spouse's retirement
benefits would be lower, as a result of the non-working
spouse's beneficiary interest in the retirement plan.

This

fact also distinguishes Innes.
Thus, from a review of cases located by the parties,
it appears that four states, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Jersey,
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and California, support the position asserted by Dr. Millikan
on Cross-Appeal.

Only one state, New Jersey, has taken a

contrary view.
III.

UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF THE MAJORITY RULE
In its pronouncements in the case of Dogu v. Dogu, 652

P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court gives guidance to
how it would rule on the issue raised on Cross-Appeal.

On

remand to the district court, the Dogu court suggested several
methods the trial court could use to distribute retirement
benefits:
(1) The court could order that respondent
elect a joint and survivor annuity under
each retirement fund where that is an
option, with appropriate adjustment to his
alimony obligation during the period
following retirement. (2) If respondent's
retirement rights permit this option, the
court could order that respondent elect that
upon his retirement appellant be paid, in
lieu of alimony after retirement, a lump sum
equal to one-half the value of the
retirement benefit as of the date of
divorce, plus investment income accumulated
thereafter. (3) The court might order that
appellants's rights to alimony continue
after respondent's death (until her own
death or remarriage).
Id. at 1311 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has already set forth the
various permissible treatments of retirement benefits.

Under

the first method of distribution in Doqu, the district court
can order retirement benefits split between the parties by
providing survivor payments to the non-working spouse.

If this

method is invoked, the income from retirement benefits is
"adjusted" out of the alimony obligation, because the
non-working spouse is provided for under the working spouse's
retirement plan.
here.

This is the result which should be applied

Under the second distribution method, retirement

benefits can be paid in a lump sum when such benefits are
payable from the retirement plan, assuming the plan provides
for lump-sum distribution.

In that case, also, the non-working

spouse will receive no alimony based on the working spouse's
retirement income.

Finally, the trial court could allow the

working spouse to retain one hundred percent of his or her
retirement benefits, and consider the benefits as "income" from
which alimony is paid.
The Utah Supreme Court's first recommended approach
should be applied in the case at bar because Mrs. Millikan is
entitled to one hundred percent survivorship rights under
Dr. Millikan's retirement plans.

Dr. and Mrs. Millikan jointly

and irrevocably chose retirement options that maximized
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survivorship benefits to Mrs. Millikan and reduced retirement
benefits payable to Dr. Millikan during his life.
The trial court in this case acknowledged
Mrs. Millikan's irrevocable right to share in Dr. Millikan's
retirement benefits and, in fact, recognized that Mrs. Millikan
would receive more from Dr. Millikan's retirement than
Dr. Millikan.

Yet, Dr. Millikan was required by the trial

court to pay alimony to Mrs. Millikan based on Dr. Millikan's
share of his retirement benefits.

This amounts to double

payment to Mrs. Millikan of the retirement benefits.

Nowhere

in Doqu does the Supreme Court allow for an alternative that
splits retirement benefits between the parties and also
entitles the non-working spouse to alimony based on the working
spouse's share of retirement benefits.

IV.

IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO TREAT RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS
BOTH MARITAL PROPERTY AND INCOME
Most states grant to their trial courts discretion to

consider vested retirement benefits in making property division
or alimony awards.

In some cases, the marital estate is

sizable and the trial court is able to off-set with property of
the marital estate an award to the working spouse of all of his
or her retirement benefits.

More often, however, the marital
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estate will not bear such an off-set award and the working
spouse will be required to pay alimony in lieu of division of
the retirement benefits*
In the latter case, upon retirement of the working
spouse, courts may require the spouse receiving retirement
benefits to continue paying alimony from retirement benefits.
Where the non-working spouse has received no portion of the
retirement benefits in the divorce, this is not an unfair
result.
Where, however, the non-working spouse is entitled to
directly receive a share of the working spouse's retirement
benefits, it is unfair to treat retirement benefits as income
and impose on the working spouse the burden of alimony.

As

noted by the Kruschel court, "pension [payments] should be
viewed as property or income, but not both."

419 N.W.2d. at

122 (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
Nearly all courts that have considered the issue on
Cross-Appeal have held that retirement benefits split between
parties to a divorce cannot be counted as income when paid to
the working spouse to then be paid out as alimony to the
non-working spouse.

The Utah Supreme Court in Docru clearly

prohibits this sort of double-counting of retirement benefits.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ " ^ day of June, 1989.
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